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A debt-based economy requires the accumulation of more and more debt to finance 2 
economic growth, while future economic growth is needed to repay the debt. And so the 3 
cycle continues. Despite global debt reaching unprecedented levels, little research has 4 
been done to understand the impacts of debt dynamics on environmental sustainability. 5 
Here we explore the environmental impacts of the debt-growth cycle in Indonesia, the 6 
world’s largest debt-based producer of palm oil. Our empirical Agent-Based Model 7 
analyses the future effects (2018-2050) of power (im)balance scenarios between debt- 8 
driven economic forces (i.e. banks, firms), and conservation forces, on two ecosystem 9 
services (food production, climate regulation) and biodiversity. The model shows the 10 
trade-offs and synergies among these indicators for Business As Usual as compared to 11 
alternative scenarios. Results show that debt-driven economic forces can partially 12 
support environmental conservation, provided the state’s role in protecting the 13 
environment is reinforced. Our analysis provides a lesson for developing countries that 14 
are highly dependent on debt-based production systems: sustainable development 15 
pathways can be achievable in the short- and medium-terms; however, reaching long-16 
term sustainability requires reduced dependency on external financial powers, as well as 17 
further government intervention to protect the environment from the rough edges of the 18 
market economy. 19 
 20 
Keywords: sustainable development; social-ecological system; debt; palm oil; 21 
ecosystem services; agent-based model. 22 
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1. Introduction 23 
The current standard approach of a debt-based economy may seriously threaten both 24 
economic development and environmental sustainability (ICSU and ISSC, 2015). 25 
Economic growth requires the accumulation of more and more debt, while future 26 
growth – fuelled by ever-increasing amounts of energy and resources – is needed to 27 
repay the debt (Daly, 2011). Although decoupling economic growth from environmental 28 
pressures is at the heart of initiatives such as the Green Economy Initiative of UNEP, 29 
frameworks for achieving this goal are still in their infancy (UNEP, 2011). Thus, there 30 
is a need to advance the current fragmented and circumstantial evidence of the 31 
relationship between debt dynamics and environmental sustainability.  32 
The debt-(un)sustainability relationship is highly noticeable in Southeast Asia, where 33 
more than $45 billion (2010-2017) in credits have been lent by overseas banks to 34 
companies operating in different natural resource sectors (e.g. palm oil, timber, pulp and 35 
paper) (Forest & Finance, 2016). The palm oil industry in Indonesia is particularly 36 
important, having borrowed more credit facilities than any other sector in the country to 37 
fund palm oil production (i.e. USD 9.4 billion), more than any other palm oil industry in 38 
Southeast Asia (Forest & Finance, 2016). 39 
Analysing the relationship between debt and environmental sustainability in Indonesia 40 
is important because this country is a focal point for key trade-offs between climate 41 
change mitigation, biodiversity conservation and food production. First, Indonesia is 42 
one of the world’s top five Green House Gas (GHG) emitting countries; this is the main 43 
reason why Indonesia has set a goal to reduce its GHG emissions by 26% by 2020 44 
(Paltseva et al., 2016). Second, tropical forests in Southeast Asia overlap with four of 45 
the world’s distinct “biodiversity hotspots”, with Indonesia having the highest plant 46 
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species richness in the world (ICCT, 2016). Finally, Indonesia is the world's biggest 47 
producer of crude palm oil (CPO), and in 2015 set the goal of nearly doubling the area 48 
for oil palm cultivation by 2020 (UNDP, 2015). 49 
The Government of Indonesia is facing opposing and conflicting goals for 2020 and 50 
beyond – to reduce GHG emissions, halt biodiversity loss and boost food production 51 
(Republic of Indonesia, 2016). Can these goals be achieved in Indonesia under a debt- 52 
based palm oil industry and economy? The Agent-Based Model (ABM) presented here 53 
examines this question by modelling the effects on social-ecological system (SES) 54 
(un)sustainability of power (im)balance scenarios between debt-driven economic forces 55 
(i.e. banks and firms) and conservation forces (i.e. governments and public institutions). 56 
The SES model shows the impact of different future scenarios (2018-2050) on CO2 57 
emissions, biodiversity loss and CPO production in Indonesia, and analyses impacts on 58 
economic and environmental indicators. The short and medium-term governance and 59 
policy implications for SES sustainability in Indonesia are discussed, together with 60 
potential long-term ‘system rigidity’ effects enhanced by power inequalities among 61 
economic and conservation forces. 62 
2. Materials and Methods 63 
2.1. Study area and problem formulation 64 
 65 
The study site (Figure 1) comprises the provinces of Kalimantan (743,330km2), Sumatra 66 
(473,481 km2) and Papua (319,036km2), making a total of 1,525,847km2. These three 67 
provinces cover 80% of the total land area in Indonesia and are some of the main 68 
producers and exporters of palm oil world-wide. Indonesian annual CPO production, 69 
which is expected to double by 2020 (UNDP, 2015), is financially supported by some of 70 
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the largest commercial banks headquartered in the U.S. (e.g. Bank of America), Europe 71 
(e.g. Credit Suisse) and China (e.g. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), among 72 
others. The palm oil industry in Indonesia received USD 9.4 million in credits between 73 
2010 and 2017 (Forest and Finance, 2016) to cover the upfront costs of producing CPO, 74 
i.e. for developing land, planting seedlings and building infrastructure (Chain Reaction 75 
Research, 2017). Such reliance on external funding by the palm oil industry encourages 76 
a continuous debt-driven CPO production process which, together with logging, mineral 77 
extraction and forest fires, threatens biodiversity and releases significant quantities of 78 
carbon into the atmosphere (Carlson et al., 2013). These environmental impacts are 79 
particularly important in Indonesia, considered to be one of the major evolutionary 80 
hotspots of biodiversity in Southeast Asia (de Bruyn et al., 2014); and where the 81 
aboveground biomass carrying capacity of some parts (essential for climate change 82 























Figure 1: Geographic location of the case-study area. Indonesia (top map) and the social-85 
ecological system modelled representing the provinces of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua 86 
(in black, bottom map). Photographs on the bottom show national examples of degraded 87 
land (left), oil palm plantations (centre), and protected primary swamp forest (right). 88 
 89 
Although various streams of ecological economics offer a biophysical view of the 90 
economy, a sound understanding of how key macroeconomic issues, e.g. global debt 91 
dynamics, are entangled with environmental shifts and destructive feedbacks at lower 92 
levels is missing (Klitgaard and Krall, 2012). The model presented here addresses this 93 
research gap while contributing to identifying how the 2020 (and further) objective of 94 
Indonesia to reduce GHG emissions, halt biodiversity loss and boost production of 95 
agricultural commodities can be achieved (Republic of Indonesia, 2016). For this 96 
purpose, four different future scenarios are modelled for the period 2018-2050: Business 97 
As Usual (BAU); Reduce Biodiversity Loss (RBL); Reduce Carbon Emissions (RCE); 98 
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and Sustainable Futures (SF) (Table 1). BAU prioritizes exponential economic growth 99 
and debt-based CPO production over conservation, whereas RBL, RCE and SF 100 
prioritize biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation and both of these, 101 
respectively ‘Scenarios’ section below). Finally, in this paper we refer to SES 102 
sustainability as a context where win-win-win results for the above-noted three 103 




1 Table 1: Narratives of the scenarios modelled. 
Scenario Description 
Business As Usual  
(BAU) 
 
Rising global demand for vegetable oils drives oil palm plantation expansion in Indonesia, which consequently 
enhances increasing amounts of borrowed credits from overseas banks to finance CPO production. This process is 
financially beneficial for both banks and palm oil companies, yet it incurs biodiversity loss and global warming. The 
Government of Indonesia is more focused on creating jobs and reducing poverty through expanding the area of oil 
palm plantations. This situation is reinforced by weak environmental governance, as well as lack of funding allocated 
by international organizations for conservation. 
Reduce Biodiversity Loss 
(RBL) 
Funding for conservation (mainly international) increases, thus benefiting biodiversity by enlarging the protected area 
network and restoring moderately degraded forests in Indonesia. Furthermore, biodiversity loss is halted by firms 
using credits, as well as public funding, to cover the additional costs of creating new plantations in degraded lands 
and to increase production efficiency in existing plantations. 
Reduce Carbon Emissions 
(RCE) 
The government of Indonesia receives international funding to maximize above-ground biomass accumulation and 
reduce carbon emissions. Highly degraded forests are restored, due to their high potential to sequestrate carbon. The 
protected area network is enlarged, yet investments are lower than in RBL since area protection benefits biodiversity 
conservation more. Carbon sequestration is also enhanced by firms using credits and public funding to create 
plantations in degraded lands (with low carbon stocks) and increasing productivity in existing cultivations. 
Sustainable Futures 
 (SF) 
Economically supported by international bodies and developed countries, the government’s goal is to enhance win-
win contexts regarding climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation. Restoration of degraded land takes 
place in both highly and moderately degraded lands, which benefit biodiversity and carbon conservation. 
Furthermore, firms use credits and public funding to increase production efficiency in existing cultivations and create 
plantations in degraded lands. 
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2.2. Modelling framework 106 
 
The ABM model was built using NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999). ABMs simulate systems 107 
of autonomous and heterogeneous agents; these interact with each other and the 108 
environment, making decisions and changing their actions and the environment as a 109 
result of these interactions (Ferber, 1999). Each agent is simulated using computer 110 
software as a data structure storing its attributes, together with algorithms that 111 
implement its behaviour, and an effect this has on other agents or the environment. 112 
ABMs are helpful for studying complex dynamics such as coupled human-natural 113 
systems (Balbi and Giupponi, 2010; Filatova et al., 2013), which are characterized by 114 
feedback loops, nonlinearity, thresholds, time lags, resilience, among other 115 
characteristics (An et al., 2014). ABMs have also proven useful in gaining general 116 
insights that support the sustainable management of resources through a better 117 
understanding of complex SES (Schulze et al., 2017). In particular, the benefits of using 118 
ABM for exploring complex coupled SES include: (i) the capturing of emergent 119 
phenomena; (ii) the simulation of heterogeneous agents, which allows the simulation of 120 
complex and nonlinear behaviours from different entities; (iii) modelling the social 121 
networks and physical space-based interactions; and (iv) obtaining a dynamic natural 122 
description of the SES studied, rather than only the final output results.  123 
An increasing number of ABMs are being built within the land-use modelling 124 
community (Verburg, 2006). Since the earliest published Agent-Based Land-Use Model 125 
(ABLUM) (see Lansing and Kremer, 1993), models have gradually progressed from 126 
conceptual land-use frameworks (e.g. Epstein and Axtell, 1996) to more complex 127 
empirical representations of SES (e.g. Bousquet and Le Page, 2004). Recent reviews 128 
and examples of ABLUMs include Filatova et al. (2013), Matthews et al. (2007), 129 
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Murray-Rust et al. (2013) or Polhill et al. (2011). Scholars have also studied the 130 
relationship between ABM and policy-making contexts. Gilbert et al. (2018) reflect on 131 
various experiences using agent-based modelling in policy-making contexts, noting that 132 
models can take on different roles when embedded in deliberations. They also observe 133 
that there are a number of realities of day-to-day policy-making that mean any 134 
modelling (agent-based or otherwise) can be difficult to incorporate successfully. Not 135 
least of these issues is that recommendations from model outcomes may be politically 136 
unacceptable. Summarizing the key lessons from the examples they describe, Gilbert et 137 
al. (2018, section 5) emphasize the issues agent-based modellers typically face with 138 
lacking data, but argue that this is not a reason not to model.” 139 
The methodological framework of this paper follows the TRACE documentation 140 
protocol (Grimm et al., 2011), a tool for planning, performing, and documenting good 141 
modelling practice. The following sections comprise short characterizations of the 142 
TRACE elements corresponding to ‘Problem Formulation’ – including a description of 143 
the study area and the scenarios modelled – ‘Model Description’ – using the Overview, 144 
Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol document (Grimm et al., 2006, 2010) – 145 
and ‘Data Evaluation’ – including model parameterization and calibration processes. 146 
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2.3. Model description 147 
 
The model description follows the Overview, Design concepts, and Details (ODD) 148 
protocol document (Grimm et al., 2010). The following sections describe the ‘Entities, 149 
state variables and scales’ and ‘Process overview and scheduling’ elements from the 150 
ODD. Note that a description of the data used in the model is not provided in the main 151 
paper due to the length of the dataset. This and further empirical data about the model 152 
can be found in the Supporting Information (SI) document, where a full ODD version is 153 
presented. . 154 
2.3.1. Entities, state variables and (spatio-temporal) scales 155 
The key entities in the model are agents – representing firms, banks and the government 156 
– and the environment – consisting of a grid of land-covers (i.e. patches). The bank 157 
agent represents the overseas financial entities funding CPO production in Indonesia 158 
through bank credits, while firms represent the investment groups, i.e. forest-risk 159 
groups, financing CPO production in Indonesia. Finally, the government agent 160 
represents, as a whole, the national and international policies focused on protecting land 161 
and restoring degraded land in Indonesia. Note that that the latter is a conceptual type of 162 
agent, which does not compute any specific policy in particular; thus, it is used to 163 
represent the potential effects that both national and international policies (similar to 164 
REDD1 schemes) would have on SES sustainability.  165 
 
1 REDD, which stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, is a United 
Nations-led program offering incentives for developing countries to preserve and enhance forests. 
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The model includes a total number of 6,480 cells (i.e. land-covers), which include 14 166 
secondary land-cover types; following Hill et al. (2015a), these are aggregated into 167 
three primary land-cover types, i.e. ‘protected areas’, ‘semi-natural areas’, and ‘oil palm 168 
plantations’. Simultaneously, ‘protected areas’ and ‘semi-natural areas’ are categorized 169 
as ‘non-forested’ or ‘forested’, the latter being classified into ‘lowland’, ‘montane’, 170 
‘heath’, ‘peat swamp’, and ‘freshwater swamp’. Figure 2 shows a Unified Modelling 171 
Language (UML) class diagram describing the model entities and variables in detail. 172 
Furthermore, Table S1 (SI document) shows a description of the entities and state 173 


















Figure 2: UML Class Diagram. Structure diagram showing the system’s classes, their attributes, attribute values, functions/operations and relationship between classes. 175 
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The model comprises the period 2018-2050, where each time step corresponds to one 176 
month, thus running the model for 384 monthly time steps (i.e. 32 years). The period 177 
2008-2016 is used for model parameterization and calibration (described below). The 178 
time-scale of the model was selected by comparing the modelling outcomes for CPO 179 
production and protected area expansion during the period 2008-2016 with historic data 180 
for these indicators during the same period. The reason for selecting these indicators to 181 
set the time-scale was because these drive the main land-cover changes and outcomes in 182 
the model. Thus, analyses of the calibrated results showed a qualitative alignment 183 
between both historic data and model outcomes when using a particular time-frame, 184 
based on 1 model time step corresponding to 1 month in the real world. The period to 185 
2050 was selected to enable sufficient time for the outcomes of the various scenarios to 186 
be realized. 187 
The spatial-scale of the model is considered to be sub-national/national, due to the case-188 
study area comprising a relatively high (i.e. 80%) amount of the total land covered by 189 
Indonesia. Furthermore, the patch size selected (235.47ha) under this spatial-scale 190 
aligns with the previously selected time-scale (i.e. 1 model time step = 1 month). Oil 191 
palm expansion was responsible for an average of 270,000ha of forest conversion 192 
annually from 2000-2011 (Henders et al., 2015), making an average of 22,500ha 193 
deforested every month, i.e. every time step in the model. The patch size selected 194 
(235.47ha) is considered sufficiently large to enable the conversion, at the specific time 195 
scale selected, of similar amounts of land into oil palm plantations. The same case 196 
applies to protected area expansion and degraded land restoration processes. Therefore, 197 
the time-scale selected for the model is adjusted upon the spatial-scale, as the time 198 
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needed in the model (under the selected time-frame) to compute land-use change aligns 199 
with the real-world land-use change processes in Indonesia.  200 
2.3.2. Simulation process and overview 201 
Figure 2 shows a UML activity diagram representing the dynamics of the system and 202 
the flow from one process to the next. The following is the list of model processes 203 
taking place every time step, which are described in detail below (see the SI document 204 
for a detailed description of model functions and algorithms): (i) compute CPO demand; 205 
(ii) banks compute credit lending; (iii) firms compute finance; (iv) banks compute credit 206 
lending; (v) firms compute resource extraction; (v) firms compute CPO price and sales; 207 
(vi) firms compute credit repayment; (vii) firms compute business expansion; (viii) 208 
patches compute age and resource extraction; (ix) patches compute indicators; (x) 209 





















Figure 3: UML Activity Diagram. Structure diagram showing the step by step process computed by 211 
agents and patches in the model.  212 
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The SES modelled is simulated under a debt-based economy, where each scenario (see 213 
Table 1) sets different rules and limits affecting the dynamics and relationships between 214 
agents and the environment. First, CPO demand (exogenously computed) is computed 215 
on a monthly basis and distributed among the existing firms based on their current price 216 
(explained below); note that CPO demand represents the consumption by households 217 
(consumers), which are not agents in the model. Second, firms borrow credits from the 218 
bank upfront, i.e. at the beginning of each financial year, in order to cover the direct and 219 
indirect operating costs of CPO production in current plantations, including resource 220 
extraction, wages for employees and other daily expenditures. Third, firms calculate the 221 
final monetary capital needed to cover the expenses for the following month using 222 
information on CPO demand; therefore, further credits are borrowed if additional 223 
funding to meet the CPO demand is needed. 224 
Firms harvest fresh fruit bunches (FFB) from the plantations they own, which is the 225 
fruit produced by oil palm trees from which CPO is obtained. Firms prioritize those 226 
plantations where the average tree age ranges between 7 and 18 years – peak production 227 
of oil palm trees –since yield gradually decreases after 18 years (Wilmar, 2017). Oil 228 
palms begin to produce fruits 30 months after being planted, with commercial harvest 229 
commencing six months later. Oil palm plantations with trees older than 25 years – max 230 
commercial lifespan – are cut down by the firm owning that land, and are replaced by 231 
new plantations with a starting age of 0 from the following month onwards. If firms 232 
cannot meet the monthly CPO demand by solely harvesting FFB from peak production 233 
plantations, those plantations with trees older than 18 years are harvested until demand 234 
is met, followed by those from 3-7 years. 235 
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After finishing the monthly harvesting process, each firm sets a price based on a 236 
combination of historic information, predicted data and other firms’ prices. The firm 237 
offering the lowest price is placed at the top of a right-skewed distribution (showing 238 
price on the x-axis and demand in the y-axis), thereby being the one prioritized by 239 
consumers. When the total CPO demand for that month is met, the CPO selling process 240 
stops. 241 
At this point, firms must start paying back their credits, with interest, to the bank. Note 242 
that, although firms in the model borrow/repay credits from/to one single bank, this 243 
bank agent (the only bank agent in the simulation) represents all financial entities, from 244 
overseas, lending money to oil palm companies in Indonesia. Furthermore, the model 245 
does not consider variations of the interest rate, despite this is known to be a major risk 246 
of debt-based agricultural production. This is because the economic system modelled 247 
does not take into account those international economic factors and processes that 248 
normally influence interest-rate variations. Hence, the model does not create 249 
endogenous interest-rate variations by itself. Nevertheless, including parameters into the 250 
model to exogenously enhance interest variations instead would not ensure the aligning 251 
of model interest oscillations with the real-world ones. Therefore, the model just 252 
integrates the constant interest-rate value provided by the World Bank in 2016. 253 
Furthermore, note that firms continuously borrow credits to cover their direct and 254 
indirect operating costs regardless of the interest to be paid.  255 
If firms have sufficient monetary capital in their deposit accounts, firms compute the 256 
credit repayment corresponding to that month; otherwise firms borrow a credit to cover 257 
the debt. Firms also consider expanding their business if their income shows a positive 258 
net increase compared to historic data, and their expectations about future profits are 259 
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positive. In such case, firms borrow a bank credit. The identification of potentially 260 
suitable sites for new plantations follows Gingold et al. (2012) and is a scenario-261 
dependent decision – where firms select areas based on their (CPO) production 262 
potential, land-cover availability and conservation potential. Eventually, each firm’s 263 
monthly income varies depending upon the profits obtained from CPO sales, and the 264 
expenditure on the wages allocated to employees, resource extraction processes (i.e. 265 
materials and equipment, plantation maintenance), technological investments to 266 
improve CPO production efficiency, and debt repaid to the bank. While costs associated 267 
with debt, wages, resource extraction, material and equipment are mandatory monthly 268 
expenditures, firms’ investment in technological development is a scenario-dependent 269 
decision. 270 
Each oil palm plantation land-cover computes an age function, as well as a stock and a 271 
growth function regarding FFB. Furthermore, each land-cover (patch) computes 272 
biodiversity and carbon stock algorithms, which change over time, based on the type of 273 
land-cover change taking place in that patch and the surrounding matrix of patches. 274 
Furthermore, while the biodiversity function considers the previous, current and next 275 
land-cover changes – both in each land cover and the surrounding ones –, carbon is 276 
calculated from losses/gains in above-ground biomass (AGB), which is then converted 277 
to carbon and CO2. Based on the amount of AGB, each land-cover computes a 278 
degradation grade that is used for restoration purposes (see below). 279 
The government (representing national and international public institutions investing in 280 
conservation in Indonesia) may intervene in the simulation by increasing government 281 
expenditure (GB) leading to strong (scenario-dependent) government policies. These 282 
interventions affect firms’ decision-making and land cover variables, thus influencing 283 
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model outcomes. More specifically, GB is focused on implementing conservation 284 
policies through allocating public funding to firms, i.e. similar to Payments for 285 
Ecosystem Services (PES) (Farley and Costanza, 2010; Wunder, 2008), in order to 286 
encourage firms to cover the additional costs regarding the following actions: (i) 287 
increasing CPO production efficiency on existing plantations by investing in 288 
technological development, and (ii) creating new oil palm plantations solely on 289 
degraded lands, instead of areas with high biodiversity and carbon stocks – which are, 290 
in principle, more profitable. Furthermore, governments can also invest in (iii) degraded 291 
land restoration, and (iv) protected areas. The selection of those land-covers to be 292 
restored and protected is based on the grade of degradation and the conservation 293 
potential, respectively, while the financial opportunity cost of CPO production is 294 
calculated (at the national level) based on the revenue foregone from CPO production as 295 
a consequence of restoration and protected area creation. As previously mentioned, the 296 
government agent, which implements the above-noted four (i-iv) GB-driven processes, 297 
represents mainly international bodies and agreements (such as REDD programs), since 298 
such conservation investments and policies are unlikely to be (solely) performed by the 299 
Government of Indonesia. 300 
2.4. Scenarios, data evaluation and run setup summary 301 
 302 
Table 1 shows a qualitative description of the rationale for each scenario (i.e. BAU, 303 
RBL, RCE and SF), while Table S5 (SI document) describes the parameters, target 304 
values and data sources selected to build and compute each scenario. Note that expert 305 
opinion was used to set the rationale for each scenario and to determine the parameters 306 
selected for the different scenarios. 307 
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We follow the TRACE documentation (Grimm et al., 2011) to perform both model 308 
parameterization and calibration processes. Model parameterization focuses on 309 
exploring model parameter values, including a list of all the parameters and values, the 310 
data sources, and how the parameter values were obtained (Railsback and Grimm, 311 
2011). In addition to Table S5 for scenarios, Table S1 (SI document) shows the model 312 
entities and their state variables, as well as the parameter types, their values/units and 313 
data sources. Among the data sources and historic data integrated in the model, of note 314 
is the use of historic banking data on debt, which drives bank and firm agents’ decision-315 
making processes. This dataset, obtained from the dataset Forest and Finance (2016), 316 
shows up-to-date information regarding the amount of credits lent by international 317 
banks to different industrial sectors in Southeast Asia, focused on funding the 318 
production of different goods and services, e.g. palm oil, timber, cotton. The dataset 319 
includes the name of banks (lenders), types of industries (borrowers), name of firms, 320 
type of credit facilities, amount allocated per year, among other information. Other 321 
empirical data integrated in the model includes the area covered by each land cover, oil 322 
palm trees’ growth rate, CPO prices, and carbon sequestration rates, among others (see 323 
Table S1, SI document).  324 
For the purpose of model calibration, both historic and literature data sources for the 325 
period 2008-2016 were used. The full model calibration process, including calibration 326 
results, is described in detail in the SI document.   327 
Finally, the model results were obtained by computing each scenario 150 times – 328 
considered a reasonable number of runs in simulation models (see Ritter et al., 2011) –329 
making a total of 600 runs. Each simulation was then run for 384 time steps (32 years, 330 
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2018-2050), where the average and standard error values from all the runs for each 331 
simulation are shown in the result figures. 332 
3. Results 333 
The results obtained are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6. These were qualitatively analysed 334 
with the objective of comparing, and identifying, differences in trends among the 335 




Figure 4: Results for SES sustainability indicators. Indicators include: crude palm oil (CPO) 338 
production (metric tons); CO2 emissions (metric tons); and biodiversity (index) – where plots show the 339 
individual net values per year. Results obtained under projected future scenarios (BAU = Business As 340 
Usual; RBL = Reduce Biodiversity Loss; RCE = Reduce Carbon Emissions; SF = Sustainable Futures). 341 
Coloured bands represent the standard error bars including all the runs computed for each indicator under 342 
every scenario, while black lines show the mean values. RBL and RCE scenarios are divided in four sub-343 
scenarios each: the darker the band’s color, the stronger the conservation forces and the weaker the 344 
economic forces (i.e. high government expenditure (GB) for conservation, low availability of bank credits 345 
(C) for production). In contrast, light colored banks refer to strong economic and weak conservation 346 




Figure 5: Results for economic indicators. Indicators include: Government Budget (USD million); 349 




Figure 6: Results for land cover change indicators. Indicators include: protected areas (percent values); 352 
restored land (ha); and opportunity cost (in USD) for the oil palm industry of increasing protected areas 353 





3.1. Business As Usual (BAU) 355 
 
The first row in Figures 4, 5 and 6 shows the results obtained under BAU. This scenario 356 
shows the highest values for most economic indicators, while environmental outcomes 357 
show mainly negative trends. This is due to the protection forces in Indonesia not being 358 
sufficiently strong to halt the economic forces driving land clearing for CPO production. 359 
Thus, oil palm firms require a continuous flow of bank credits to expand oil palm 360 
plantations – normally into areas with high biodiversity (e.g. undisturbed upland forests) 361 
and high carbon stocks (e.g. swamp forests). As a result, the number of credits 362 
borrowed and CPO production increase over time, while the opportunity cost of not 363 
converting land into oil palm plantations continues to decrease. Concurrently, 364 
biodiversity loss and CO2 emissions are reinforced, also due to the low level of 365 
government policies to support conservation – which nevertheless are steadily 366 
increasing over time. Regardless of the weak protection forces compared to economic 367 
ones, protected and restored land slowly increase, which aligns with current data 368 
regarding terrestrial protected land (World Bank, 2018). 369 
3.2. Reducing Biodiversity Loss (RBL) and Reducing Carbon 370 
Emissions (RCE) 371 
 
The second and third rows in Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the results obtained for RBL and RCE 372 
scenarios, respectively. As previously indicated, each RBL and RCE scenario is divided in four 373 
different sub-scenarios, with varying values regarding two variables: BC (bank credits) and GB 374 
(government budget); in particular, four different sub-scenarios are considered, namely high GB 375 
and low BC, high GB and BC, low GB and BC, and low GB and high BC. These refer to the 376 
amount of monetary capital initially (i.e. at the beginning of the simulation) available for 377 
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conservation and CPO production, respectively. Furthermore, GB and BC are invested in 378 
different conservation and production strategies characteristic of each scenario  379 
RBL and RCE scenarios show similar trends for most indicators, which, as per the SF 380 
scenario (see below), minimize land requirements by intensifying CPO production. 381 
Some monetary-economic indicators (credits borrowed by firms and firms’ turnovers), 382 
as well as some environmental indicators (CPO production), show more negative results 383 
than those under BAU, due to economic forces driving land clearing for CPO 384 
production being weaker than conservation forces. Under RBL, strict enforcement of 385 
forest protection enhances the creation of new protected areas, land restoration and the 386 
creation of new policies that force firms to decrease the number of new plantations in 387 
areas with high biodiversity. Biodiversity, therefore, increases with higher GB values; 388 
the same occurs for CO2 emissions, where more sustainable results are obtained under 389 
scenarios with high GB values. The main difference between RBL and RCE, in terms of 390 
biodiversity and CO2 emissions, is based on the type of forests restored: while 391 
moderately degraded forest is least favoured for restoration under RCE, highly degraded 392 
forest is least favoured under RBL, thus enhancing higher biodiversity values under 393 
RBL and lower CO2 emissions under RCE (see Table 1).  394 
3.3. Reducing Biodiversity Loss (RBL) and Reducing Carbon 395 
Emissions (RCE) 396 
 
The fourth row in Figures 4, 5 and 6 shows the results obtained under the SF scenario. 397 
This is the only scenario showing synergies between CPO production, CO2 emissions 398 
and biodiversity, as well as relatively positive results for the rest of indicators. As 399 
analysed in the Discussion section below, these results reflect a combination of the 400 
following factors: (i) the use of technology by firms to increase production efficiency in 401 
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existing cultivations, which significantly reduces land requirements for CPO 402 
production; (ii) the creation of new plantations solely on degraded lands, thus avoiding 403 
plantation expansion into areas with high biodiversity and carbon stocks; (iii) the 404 
increase in the amount of degraded land restored; and (iv) the increase in the number 405 
and extent of protected areas. 406 
3.4. Environmental impacts of Power Imbalances between banks and 407 
government RCE) 408 
 
 Results shown in Figure 7 allow us to explore the extent to which biodiversity and CO2 409 
emission values vary under different Power Imbalance contexts between economic 410 
forces (represented by banks and credit allocation to firms, i.e. BC) and conservation 411 
forces (represented by the policies and budget allocated for conservation, from both 412 
national and international public entities, i.e. GB), under each scenario. The calculation 413 
of Power Imbalance values (i.e. x-axis) follows a simple calculation process between 414 





Figure 7: Impact on biodiversity and CO2 emissions of Power Imbalance values. The top heatmap 416 
shows the impact of different power (im)balance rates between economic and conservation forces on 417 
biodiversity, while the bottom heatmap shows the same impacts on CO2 emissions (in millions of tons). 418 
Dark coloured cells represent high values, while low values are represented by light coloured cells. Cells 419 
in blank show those scenarios with neither biodiversity nor CO2 emission values computed for certain 420 
Power Imbalance values. See main text for an explanation of the abbreviations in the y-axis. 421 
The higher the power imbalance values (i.e. right-hand side values in the x-axis), the 422 
higher the amount of BC available for CPO production compared to GB for 423 
conservation. The lower the power imbalance values (i.e. left-hand side values in the y-424 
axis), the lower the amount of BC available for CPO production compared to BC.  425 
Both RBL and RCE scenarios are divided in 4 different sub-scenarios each, showing the 426 
amount of monetary capital initially available for CPO production (BC) and 427 
conservation (GB). The following list disaggregates the abbreviations shown in the y-428 
axis for RCE and RBL scenarios, where ‘h’ refers to ‘high’ and ‘l’ to ‘low’. See Table 429 
S5 (SI document) for the values referring to high and low: 430 
• RBL_ll: RBL scenario with low (‘l’) GB and low (‘l’) BC. 431 
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• RBL _lh: RBL scenario with low (‘l’) GB and high (‘h’) BC. 432 
• RBL _hl: RBL scenario with high (‘h’) GB and low (‘l’) BC. 433 
• RBL _hh: RBL scenario with high (‘h’) GB and high (‘h’) BC. 434 
Note that each scenario (y-axis) not only consists of different GB and BC values (i.e. 435 
monetary capital invested for conservation or CPO production), but also includes other 436 
processes and properties characteristic of each scenario, e.g. different rates of 437 
technological efficiency selected for CPO production by firms, potential areas selected 438 
for restoring degraded lands (see Table S5, SI document).  439 
Figure 7 shows that high Power Imbalance values (i.e. x-axis), under the BAU scenario 440 
(i.e. y-axis), exert negative impacts on both biodiversity and CO2 emissions. In contrast, 441 
the SF scenario shows considerably higher values for both indicators. The different sub-442 
scenarios represented by RBL and RCE show varying results regarding both indicators, 443 
including trade-offs among sub-scenarios, with predominantly better results (in terms of 444 
sustainability) obtained for biodiversity under RBL and CO2 under RCE.  445 
4. Discussion 446 
4.1. Analysing the relationship between conservation forces, 447 
economic powers and SES sustainability in Indonesia 448 
 
Oil palm development, forest conservation and climate change mitigation are strategies 449 
that are, at first glance, in opposition to one another (UNEP, 2011). Considering that the 450 
same debt-based economy is modelled under both BAU and SF scenarios, the main 451 
factor driving SES (un)sustainability among these scenarios is the (in)appropriate use 452 
that oil palm companies make of bank credits – rather than the amount of credits 453 
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borrowed or the debt-based nature of the economic system itself. Thus, the problem 454 
causing unsustainable outcomes is not the economic system itself – an economic system 455 
that creates a high dependency of different actors on debt and banks – but the purpose 456 
for which credit facilities are borrowed and allocated. In fact, the SF scenario (Figure 7) 457 
shows synergies between debt (i.e. credits borrowed), high biodiversity and low CO2 458 
emissions, showing that the use of bank credits more in line with concerted land 459 
conservation may be beneficial for SES sustainability. These results, therefore, align 460 
with recent research arguing that the current utilization of credit facilities by firms – 461 
focused on covering daily operating costs and expanding oil palm plantations into areas 462 
with high biodiversity and carbon stocks – is a key problem for sustainability in 463 
Indonesia (Alwarritzi et al., 2015). In this regard, scholars argue that using bank credits 464 
to increase production efficiency in existing oil palm cultivations could be sufficient to 465 
meet the growing world demand for Indonesian CPO, while helping conserve the highly 466 
valuable habitats in terms of biodiversity and carbon sequestration. For instance, 467 
Fairhurst (2009) shows that yield improvements in existing cultivation alone could 468 
potentially avoid the need to expand into 1.6 million hectares of forest. Simultaneously, 469 
planting oil palms in degraded land is suggested as an alternative solution to help meet 470 
global CPO demand, while avoiding the release of excessive CO2 to the atmosphere and 471 
further biodiversity loss (Koh and Ghazoul, 2010).  472 
The problem with alternative solutions focused on enhancing sustainable CPO 473 
production is that debt-dependent palm oil companies, such as firms under the BAU 474 
scenario, are unlikely to use credit facilities to finance less profitable, financially riskier 475 
‘innovative’ CPO production processes, i.e. create new plantations in degraded lands 476 
and investing in technological efficiency (e.g. high-yielding oil palm genome projects, 477 
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or information systems providing real-time results on palm oil plantations). Similarly, 478 
banks are unlikely to lend to firms unless the credit is used to finance processes or 479 
activities that ensure short-term profits for firms and, thus, provide financial security for 480 
banks. Currently, traditional oil palm cultivation, in biologically rich areas, provides 481 
firms with higher short-term profits, due to the low price of land in these areas. In fact, 482 
‘innovative’ palm oil companies (i.e. firms implementing the above-noted more 483 
sustainable strategies) would probably be under-cut on international markets by 484 
traditional palm oil producers from other countries (i.e. BAU firms). In view of this, 485 
there is a need to financially support oil palm companies to shift their BAU paradigm to 486 
more sustainable scenarios. For instance, our model shows funding being allocated to 487 
oil palm companies under the SF scenario, which helps firms cover the additional costs 488 
of increasing technological efficiency in existing plantations and establish new 489 
plantations in degraded lands. Thus, new financial mechanisms could help firms cover 490 
the currently higher costs of adopting more sustainable practices (see Ruysschaert et al., 491 
2011); until technological development or the market itself – due to land scarcity – 492 
starts inherently supporting more sustainable CPO production, i.e. due to a reduction of 493 
prices and operational costs related to more sustainable practices.  494 
In this regard, PES (Farley and Costanza, 2010; Wunder, 2008) could be considered a 495 
potential short-term (temporary) solution within the transition towards long-term 496 
sustainability. PES seek to ascribe monetary value to ES (Bellver-Domingo et al., 497 
2016), for instance through international schemes, such as REDD programs. REDD 498 
offers incentives for developing countries to preserve and enhance forests, thus 499 
offsetting the growth in global GHG emissions (Angelsen, 2008). The model presented 500 
here shows that, if sufficient funding is allocated to firms for enhancing more 501 
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sustainable CPO production mechanisms, short- and medium-term synergies among the 502 
sustainability indicators explored could be reinforced. In fact, results show that this 503 
could take place without having to replace the debt-based (economic) production system 504 
nor reducing the current power of banks. Thus, there is a need to increase the socio-505 
political and financial support from international bodies to Indonesian oil palm 506 
companies (e.g. PES schemes) to enhance the delivery of multiple beneficial ES. As an 507 
example, as a follow up of the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in 508 
Cancun, Mexico, Indonesia signed a US$1 billion deal with Norway in 2010, under the 509 
REDD framework, aimed at reducing deforestation (Lang, 2010). Furthermore, it is 510 
expected that 200 billion Euros will be transferred world-wide through PES schemes by 511 
2020 (GIZ, 2016). The problem here is that funding for development is usually much 512 
higher than that for conservation (Hill, 2015b; Laurance 2018); for instance, the leaders 513 
of the G20 nations gave a huge boost to the power of development regimes by 514 
promising to invest 60-70 trillion U.S. dollars for new infrastructure projects by the year 515 
2030 (Hill, 2015b; Laurance, 2018). Therefore, if the objective is for PES to be able to 516 
compete with the agricultural sector, investments for PES and other financial 517 
mechanisms need to increase (Butler et al., 2009). 518 
Besides this, results obtained under low Power Imbalance values in the SF scenario (see 519 
darker coloured cells under RBL_hl and RCE_hl scenarios, Figure 7) also show the 520 
need to enhance conservation forces in terms of increasing the number and extent of 521 
protected areas, as well as restoring degraded land. Under these scenarios, the power of 522 
governance forces driving land protection and restoration is higher than that from banks 523 
and economic forces driving land clearing for CPO production. As a result, Figure 7 524 
shows the positive impact in biodiversity and carbon sequestration of having stronger 525 
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conservation forces. Furthermore, an increase in the funding allocated for both 526 
enlarging the current protected area network and restoring part of the 46.7 million 527 
hectares of degraded land present in Indonesia would help drive sustainability. These 528 
results can help the Indonesian government in responding to recent criticism 529 
(Murdiyarso et al., 2011) about giving greater importance to land protection than 530 
restoration through the REDD agreement with Norway. In fact, recent research 531 
demonstrates that the creation of protected areas in Indonesian forests is a less effective 532 
way of halting deforestation and biodiversity loss than restoring degraded land (Symes 533 
et al., 2015). Yet, our results demonstrate the two pathways are not mutually exclusive 534 
and support both ongoing protected area creation and the proposal for the inclusion of 535 
part of the 400,000 hectares of highly degraded lowland forest into the moratorium. 536 
It is important to note that the outcomes of the model are dependent on the framing of 537 
the scenarios and the model itself. In this regard, though it makes policy 538 
recommendations, the work discussed here is not embedded in a policy-making process, 539 
but instead uses a case-study to explore the principles underlying the role of debt in 540 
managing SES. As Polhill et al. (2019) note, policy-makers typically rely on a diverse, 541 
trusted sources when making decisions, and, critically, the results from the model need 542 
to be delivered in a clear, transparent way at the right time. The point is picked up by 543 
Elsawah et al. (2020), who, discussing models of SES in general (not just ABMs), 544 
suggest improving modellers’ understanding of the processes underlying political 545 
decision-making as a way forward. Haigh’s (1998) observations on the development of 546 




Overall, our results, from our SF scenario, show evidence that, with various 549 
adjustments, a compromise solution regarding the dual objectives of CO2 emissions and 550 
biodiversity – while enhancing CPO production and oil palm companies’ income – can 551 
be achieved under a debt-based economy. More specifically, these mutual benefits 552 
occur when firms make a more appropriate, and sustainable, use of credit facilities, and 553 
when governments support stronger conservation policy in Indonesia. In this regard, the 554 
role of international financial support will be essential to compensate the lack of 555 
incentives allocated by the Indonesian Government for environmental conservation. The 556 
latter situation is reinforced by governments from developing countries being usually 557 
more focused on reducing poverty and social issues than on solving environmental 558 
sustainability issues (Redfield, 1996).  559 
Yet, whilst our model shows evidence that, under certain conditions, achieving a win-560 
win-win outcome in Indonesia is potentially achievable, we argue that it is necessary to 561 
perform sustainability studies that go beyond trade-off analyses. Examining the nature, 562 
and inherent mechanisms, of debt-based SES can help us to explore whether these can 563 
be truly sustainable in the long-term. The following section explores this issue as a 564 
starting point regarding the internal and external mechanisms that may be driving long-565 
term (un)sustainability in Indonesia. 566 
4.2. What factors enhance system rigidity and long-term 567 
(un)sustainability in debt-based SES? 568 
 
Besides achieving win-win-win scenarios for the selected indicators (i.e. SES 569 
sustainability in this paper), long-term sustainability can be defined as a system’s ability 570 
to persist over time (Dawson et al., 2010). In other words, sustainability occurs over an 571 
infinite time horizon in which the objective is to maintain system functions, i.e. the goal 572 
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is to continue to play the game (Carse, 1987). Although our modelling shows positive 573 
results for different indicators, some scholars argue that Indonesia possesses some 574 
particular characteristics that could be hindering long-term sustainability (Ulanowicz et 575 
al., 2009). Besides the trade-off analysis performed, our results also show the lack of 576 
capacity of the SES modelled to cultivate internal autocatalysis, as well as its high 577 
dependency on unstable external financial institutions. It is argued that these 578 
characteristics turn SESs into ‘rigid’ systems (see Burkhard et al., 2011). System 579 
rigidity refers to a situation where a system becomes so efficient in its processes that 580 
there is little room for further innovation and sustainability (Fath et al., 2015). 581 
Characteristics of a rigid system include: very few key nodes and a high concentration 582 
of influence; being highly vulnerable to external disturbances because of reduced 583 
diversity (Fath et al., 2015); and brittleness, i.e. lack of resilience (Jackson, 2010). As 584 
shown by our model, Indonesia possesses a high dependency on external financial 585 
institutions (i.e. banks), with two main nodes (i.e. palm oil industry and banks) and a 586 
primary single pathway connecting both agents, “navigated” by credits and interest.  587 
We highlight four main socio-economic and political factors that could be 588 
strengthening, and reinforcing, long-term system rigidity in Indonesia. First, Indonesia 589 
is the top exporter of palm oil in the world; between 2000 and 2014, exports and 590 
consumption of CPO in Indonesia increased from 5 to 22Mt and from 3 to 11 Mt, 591 
respectively (USDA, 2014). The current significant contribution of oil palm production 592 
to regional, national and local economies (Zen et al., 2005) will be supported, at least in 593 
the near future, by doubling the land area under oil palm by 2020 (UNDP, 2015). 594 
Second, CPO production has resulted in economic improvement of rural areas by 595 
providing jobs for local people (Hirawan, 2011). More specifically, increasing 596 
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agricultural incomes from CPO production is critical for poor smallholder households 597 
that depend largely on natural resources for their livelihood (Klasen et al., 2013). Third, 598 
system rigidity is also enhanced by the reliance of the palm oil industry on upfront 599 
capital funding from overseas banks, needed to develop land, plant seedlings and build 600 
infrastructure (Chain Reaction Research, 2017). Thus, the current debt-based palm oil 601 
industry is supported by both banks and the industry itself, since it enhances a win-win 602 
economic context where the former gain benefits from the interest on their loans and the 603 
latter continues to increase its turnover due to the rising demand for CPO. Moreover, 604 
the risk averse nature of banks and farmers, as well as the high operational costs, leaves 605 
little room for change in terms of carrying out more sustainable practices (Ruysschaert 606 
et al., 2011). Last, but not least, weak conservation governance in most tropical 607 
countries does not help to counterbalance system rigidity supported by the debt-driven 608 
palm oil industry. This places BAU economic forces at a privileged position at the 609 
expense of conservation forces (Hill et al., 2015a). As a result, developing countries, 610 
such as Indonesia, do not possess enough funding for conservation (or are not willing to 611 
use it for that purpose), nor receive enough international financial support. For instance, 612 
although Indonesia signed the US$1 billion deal with Norway under the REDD 613 
framework (Lang, 2010), so far, the agreement has not made much difference to the rate 614 
of deforestation – due to corruption, bad practices, and stronger economic forces 615 
compared to conservation (Lang, 2010; Lang, 2017).  616 
With regard to the win-win context created by the debt-based CPO production for both 617 
the industry and banks, it important to mention that 14 of the 32 Indonesian billionaires 618 
identified by Forbes magazine have accumulated their wealth at least in part through the 619 
palm oil industry (Forbes, 2018). This includes 6 of the country’s 10 richest, and 12 of 620 
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its wealthiest twenty. Since Indonesia continues to be the world’s top producer of the 621 
commodity since the palm oil boom of the 2000s, this country is becoming one of the 622 
most unequal societies. Hence, wealth is concentrated in few billionaires while the rest 623 
of the country remains poor at lower socio-economic scales. 624 
The previously mentioned factors are creating a ‘rigid’ context in Indonesia; where a 625 
debt-driven CPO production system, in which the debt is not used in ways that promote 626 
sustainable outcomes, will likely continue to be socio-economically supported in the 627 
long-term by different key actors – including banks, oil palm companies, farmers and 628 
the government. Thus, a long-term shift in the mainstream BAU thinking is required 629 
among palm oil stakeholders and farmers through novel farmer policy guidance, 630 
environmental legislation and incentive mechanisms to drive sustainability. In this 631 
regard, in addition to the previously discussed PES schemes, favouring partial public 632 
(governmental) intervention in the CPO market system could also help reducing system 633 
rigidity. For instance, market intervention through different policies could address the 634 
Indonesian smallholders’ aversion to risk, currently represented by their unwillingness 635 
to use credit facility to create new plantations in degraded lands. Hence, cheaper bank 636 
financing mechanisms (e.g. interest-free loans) offered by more secure financial entities, 637 
e.g. micro-finance institutions (see Ruysschaert et al., 2011) could incentivize a more 638 
sustainable use of bank credits by farmers. Similarly, stronger conservation governance 639 
could help compensate for the negative environmental impacts exerted by the stronger 640 
financial powers driving land clearing in Indonesia. In fact, good conservation 641 
governance has proved successful in reducing deforestation and the number of 642 
unprotected forests in some tropical areas, such as the Amazon (Soares-Filho et al., 643 
2006). However, high levels of corruption and low public governance quality in 644 
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Indonesia, which was ranked second to last in a Global Competitiveness Report survey 645 
in 2015 (OECD, 2016), could be hindering long-term sustainability and system rigidity 646 
through low levels of funding allocation for environmental conservation (Sodhi et al., 647 
2007). We argue that the problem here is the political difficulty of implementing 648 
policies that, indirectly, reduce the power of influential financial institutions that are not 649 
interested in any paradigm shift. Thus, governments are usually not free to create new 650 
institutions that could help encourage long-term sustainability, but must take account of 651 
the influence of industries and other interest groups (Abel et al., 2006). This is due to 652 
the high dependency of national economies on very few corporations or monopolies, 653 
which could be one of the reasons why systems so often remain maladapted to current 654 
unsustainable conditions, to the point of collapse (Abel et al., 2006).  655 
We argue that developing countries, such as Indonesia, could benefit from better 656 
conservation governance, as well as higher levels of public expenditure through 657 
international PES schemes (Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose, 2007). For this purpose, 658 
governments from developed countries will need to assist developing countries in their 659 
effort to enhance natural resource sustainability under debt-based economic systems 660 
(Balmford et al., 2002). 661 
5. Conclusions and further research 662 
The results of our modelling of the debt-based CPO in Indonesia shows that achieving 663 
sustainability is largely depending on whether the Indonesian, and global, societies are 664 
prepared to either pay the financial and societal costs of reigning in oil palm 665 
development, or accepting a comparatively smaller trade-off with agricultural land in 666 
return for increasing environmental sustainability. We show that it is possible to pursue 667 
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a course of sustainable development that substantially minimizes trade-offs in the short 668 
to medium-term. In particular, the modelling (SF scenario) showed synergies among 669 
different sustainability indicators under certain socio-economic and governance 670 
contexts. The alternatives – whereby economic growth has priority through oil palm 671 
expansion (BAU scenario), or biodiversity and CO2 absorption are indirectly enhanced 672 
together with a partial decrease in CPO production (RBE and RCE scenarios) – implied 673 
substantial losses of either biodiversity or CPO stocks (or both), with increasing CO2 674 
emissions. 675 
More specifically, we conclude that: 676 
(1) economic-development forces are stronger than conservation forces in Indonesia, 677 
driven by an inappropriate, and unsustainable, use of credit facilities by palm oil 678 
companies. This situation is currently strengthened and reinforced by weak 679 
conservation governance; 680 
 681 
(2) synergies among ES and biodiversity can be enhanced; not by incurring a change 682 
or replacement of the current debt-based economic or CPO production systems, but 683 
by shifting the mainstream BAU thinking of key economic actors. Shifting market-684 
driven, capitalist forces to support environmental conservation requires novel 685 
farmer policy guidance, environmental legislation and incentive mechanisms from 686 
international bodies and developed countries; and 687 
 688 
(3) there is a need to enhance conservation governance in Indonesia. Not only in terms 689 
of increasing protected areas and restoring degraded land, but also favouring 690 
partial, responsible governmental intervention in the CPO market system. 691 
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This research, and its conclusions, could be strengthened by modelling a more complex 692 
banking system, including further credit lending mechanisms; and exploring the extent 693 
to which overseas banks are willing to lend credits to firms to finance innovative CPO 694 
production processes (e.g. for technology efficiency improvements and degraded land 695 
upgrading) – instead of traditional palm oil cultivation processes. Exploring alternative 696 
banking mechanisms that enhance profits for both firms and banks, while supporting 697 
environmental conservation, would strengthen the analysis. Conservation forces can be 698 
further specified in the model by integrating specific empirical data from current PES 699 
schemes. Furthermore, the model could benefit from carrying out participatory 700 
processes with stakeholders, including farmers and government agents, banks and oil 701 
palm companies. Thus, integrating data from the bottom-up would enable a more 702 
detailed modelling analysis regarding the relationships, adaptive behaviour and 703 
dynamics between agents and the environment modelled, and provide opportunities for 704 
them to learn from one another in ways that could drive greater support for 705 
sustainability initiatives that produce win-win-win outcomes.  706 
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